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Abstract 
In a large number of products liability lawsuits, sellers assert that plaintiffs’ claims 
should be rejected because their products fall under some federal regulatory regime, and 
that the regulatory statute takes precedence over or “preempts” state tort law.  This paper 
is an attempt to set out a positive theory of the doctrine on preemption of products 
liability claims.  The federal case law is largely consistent with an approach that seeks to 
minimize the costs of erroneous decisions to preempt tort lawsuits.  In particular, two 
factors explain many of the outcomes of the preemption cases in federal courts: agency 
independence and the degree of congruence between the regulatory and common law 
standards. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In a large number of products liability lawsuits, sellers assert that plaintiffs’ tort 
claims should be rejected because their products fall under some federal regulatory 
regime, and that the regulatory statute takes precedence over or “preempts” state tort law.  
This paper is an attempt to set out a positive theory of the doctrine on preemption of 
products liability claims. 
  
The case law on products liability preemption is full of references to legislative 
intent.  These references suggest that if one were to read the preemption provisions of the 
statutes, one could predict which tort claims would be preempted and which would not.  
But anyone who takes the time to read the statutes and case outcomes would be disabused 
of this notion.  The preemption provisions in the statutes are ambiguous.  The different 
case outcomes are difficult to reconcile on the basis of the statutory language. 
 
To be sure, the legislative intent approach has faded somewhat.  It reached a high 
point with the Supreme Court’s decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.1  Recent 
Court decisions have moved toward an “implied preemption” approach that looks for 
actual conflicts between common law and federal regulations.  Preemption doctrine is in 
many respects unsettled.  Still, the references to legislative intent remain in much of the 
established case law and in many new decisions. 
 
My aim is to show that preemption doctrine can be explained largely by objective 
factors that do not require the divining of Congress’s intent.  The federal case law is 
largely consistent with an approach that seeks to minimize the costs of erroneous 
decisions to preempt tort lawsuits.  In particular, two factors explain many of the 
outcomes of the preemption cases: the degree of congruence between the regulatory and 
common law standards and the perceived degree of agency independence. 
 
After setting out an “error cost” model, and using it to explain federal preemption 
case law, I conduct an empirical analysis using samples of federal and state preemption 
cases.  The empirical analysis can be viewed as preliminary, or as a more rigorous 
version of the argument based on case law, because there is a possible sample-selection 
bias that my sample (court opinions) will not permit me to correct.  Still, results from the 
federal case sample are quite consistent with my arguments based on the case law and the 
predictions of the model.  The probability of preemption increases with the degree of 
congruence between the regulatory and common law standard, and agency review 
processes that are perceived to be independent and rigorous result in higher rates of 
preemption.  The state case sample does not fit the model as well, in part because of 
sparseness of the sample, and in part because the state courts appear to have a less 
deferential, or more interventionist, approach to preemption cases. 
 
Although this paper’s focus is on preemption law, a closely related literature 
examines the optimal combination of regulation and litigation as law enforcement 
                                                 
1 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
 3
mechanisms.2  Since a decision by a court to preempt litigation leaves regulation as the 
sole enforcement mechanism, studying optimal preemption is equivalent to studying the 
optimal combination of regulation and litigation.  However, this paper differs from the 
previous economic literature in several ways: by examining a particular area of law, 
products liability; by offering a positive theory of the case law on preemption, and by 
conducting an empirical test of the theory using preemption case outcomes in federal and 
state courts. 
 
 
II. Law and Literature: An Overview 
 
Preemption of products liability claims is still a rapidly developing area of the 
law, which should not surprise anyone given that products liability itself began, more or 
less, in the late 1960s with the publication of Section 402A of the Second Restatement of 
Torts.  Indeed, the first federal court opinion to focus on the preemption question in 
products liability appears to be Wood v. General Motors,3 decided in 1988.4 
 
Under standard preemption analysis courts examine express and implied 
preemption.  Express preemption occurs when the federal statute at issue says clearly that 
it preempts state law tort claims.  Under the Constitution’s Supremacy clause, courts are 
bound to follow a federal statute’s unambiguous instruction to preempt state law.  
Implied preemption, in contrast, occurs in the absence of clear preemption instructions 
and takes two forms: field and conflict preemption.  The former is said to occur when 
federal regulation is so extensive that it leaves virtually no room for the states to regulate.  
The latter is said to occur when there is a conflict between federal and state law, such that 
it would be virtually impossible to comply with both. 
 
Congress seldom speaks clearly with respect to preemption.  As a consequence, 
few if any federal regulatory statutes express an unambiguous legislative intent to 
preempt state tort law.  The case law seldom found express preemption of tort claims 
until the Supreme Court’s decision in Cipollone, which dramatically altered the doctrine.5  
In Cipollone, the Court found that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 
expressly preempted state law failure to warn claims based on inadequate cigarette 
labeling.  The relevant portion of the statute, section 5(b), said: 
                                                 
2 See Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 Rand J. Econ. 
271-80 (1984); Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Studies, 357-74 
(1984) (hereinafter, Shavell, Liability for Harm); Edward L. Gleaser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the 
Regulatory State, 41 J. Econ. Literature 401-25 (2003); Chenggang Xu & Katherina Pistor, Law 
Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation, Columbia 
Law School Working Paper No. 222, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=396141 . 
3 865 F.2d 395 (1st Cir. 1988). 
4 Another early substantial treatment appears in Abner Mikva’s opinion in Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 
736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984), a Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) case.  There 
are several cases predating Wood and Ferebee that touch on the preemption issue, but only tangentially and 
without focus.  Many of these cases are included in the sample used in the empirical section of this paper. 
5 Indeed, before Cipollone, the trend ran largely against finding preemption, under either an express or 
implied theory.  Many courts held that federal regulatory statutes provided only minimum standards, which 
could (and should) be supplemented by state tort standards. 
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No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be 
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of 
any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the 
provisions of this Act.6 
 
The Supreme Court concluded that this provision “sweeps broadly,”7 preempting both 
state statutory and common law rules. 
 
Cipollone turned preemption doctrine on its head, though only for a brief period.  
Before 1992 (the date of Cipollone) courts talked largely in terms of implied preemption, 
since no court could safely conclude, on the basis of the language typically found in a 
federal statute, that Congress intended to bar private tort suits.  Immediately after 
Cipollone, courts began finding evidence of legislative intent to preempt in language that 
was considered to “sweep broadly,” like the language of the statute in Cipollone.  For 
example, in King v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co.,8 the First Circuit read the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) to preempt failure to warn claims 
based on language in the statute that seemed similar to the language of the preemption 
provision in Cipollone.  Some scholars argued that express preemption had become the 
dominant mode of analysis, and implied preemption theories had been abandoned.9 
 
The Cipollone period came to an end in 1996 with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr.10  In Lohr, the Court stared at a preemption provision that 
looked very much like the one in Cipollone and concluded that it did not preempt state 
tort law.  The plaintiff had brought failure to warn, negligence, and strict liability claims 
against Medtronic when her pacemaker failed.  The pacemaker had been approved for 
marketing by the Food and Drug Administration under the Medical Devices Amendment 
Act of 1976.  The statute sets out a two-tiered review scheme for “Class III” medical 
devices, such as the pacemaker, which have the greatest impact on life.  The two-tiered 
review involves either a rigorous pre-market approval process or a designation that the 
product is substantially equivalent to a device that was on the market before 1976.  If the 
product meets the “substantial equivalence” test, it does not have to undergo the pre-
market approval process, and is approved for marketing as long as it is no more 
dangerous or less effective than the earlier comparable device.  The plaintiff’s pacemaker 
in Lohr had been approved for marketing under the substantial equivalence test. 
 
Although the preemption provision of Lohr was virtually identical to that of 
Cipollone, the Court, which split in three ways, was unanimous in the view that it did not 
preempt defective design claims.  The plurality offered several lawyerly distinctions 
between the regulation in Lohr and that in Cipollone.  However, the one distinction on 
                                                 
6 15 U.S.C.A. §1334(b). 
7 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521. 
8 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993). 
9 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts 851 (6th ed. 1995). 
10 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
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which the whole Court agreed was that the substantial equivalence test led to no 
regulatory requirements that could come into conflict with state tort law. 
 
Since 1996 the lower courts, following Lohr, have returned to a focus on implied 
preemption analysis.  Under this approach, courts look for evidence of a potential conflict 
between federal regulation and the specific requirements implied by the plaintiff’s tort 
theory.  For example, in Lewis v. Brunswick Corp.,11 the Eleventh Circuit, confronting a 
preemption provision that looked similar to that in Cipollone, concluded that the 
plaintiff’s negligence and defective design claims were preempted.  This was not because 
of the language of the preemption provision.  It was because the plaintiff’s theory, in the 
court’s view, would have required the defendant boat maker to install a safety device – a 
propeller guard – that the Coast Guard had decided not to require pursuant to its duty 
under the Federal Boat Safety Act. 
 
The Supreme Court appears to have entered an advanced stage of implied 
preemption analysis in recent years with its decisions in Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,12 
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,13 and Bates v. Dow Agrosciences.14  In this new stage, the 
Court is applying implied preemption analysis in a conservative manner, refusing to find 
preemption unless there is evidence of a serious conflict between federal regulation and 
state tort law.  In Geier the Court found such evidence when it looked at the potential 
conflict between Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 and the plaintiff’s defective 
design claim based on the defendant car manufacturer’s failure to install an airbag.  The 
Court found that the plaintiff’s claim was preempted because it would have conflicted 
with the Department of Transportation’s decision to provide compliance options for car 
manufacturers. 
 
Sprietsma, on the other hand, found that the plaintiff’s demand for a propeller 
guard was not preempted by the Federal Boat Safety Act, the opposite result of the 
Eleventh Circuit in Lewis.  In spite of the different result, the Court did not reject the 
implied preemption approach of Lewis, it simply applied the analysis with greater caution 
and skepticism toward broad claims of preemption.  After looking closely at the Coast 
Guard’s analysis of the propeller guard issue, the Court decided that its refusal to adopt a 
uniform propeller guard requirement did not preclude a court from finding that a 
particular boat design was defectively dangerous because it failed to include a propeller 
guard. 
 
The Court’s most recent preemption case, Bates, found that defective design and 
manufacture claims were not preempted by FIFRA, and information-based claims (failure 
to warn and fraud) were preempted only if they required information disclosure that was 
not parallel to the requirements of the statute.15  This is a clear rejection of the approach 
                                                 
11 107 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1997). 
12 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
13 537 U.S. 51 (2002). 
14 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
15 Id. at 444-48. 
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to FIFRA analysis adopted by some courts – e.g. King – during the express preemption 
period. 
 
Many commentators have noted the confusion and uncertainty in preemption 
doctrine, and some have urged the enactment of a regulatory compliance defense in order 
to bring certainty to the law.  Viscusi (1994) argues that a regulatory compliance defense 
would be desirable in areas in which the federal regulatory scheme provides optimal or 
excessive deterrence.16  He offers the drug approval process under the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act as a case study of an area in which a regulatory compliance defense would 
be socially desirable.  Schwartz argues that courts (or legislators) should adopt a general 
(default rule) regulatory compliance defense because it is more likely that an erroneous 
decision to set the standard of care too low will be corrected by Congress than an 
erroneous decision to set the standard of care too high.17 
 
In the remainder, I will reject both views – i.e., that preemption doctrine is in a 
state of confusion and that a regulatory compliance defense is necessary.  The case law is 
largely defensible on economic grounds.  In addition, some of the cases that seem to be in 
tension, such as Geier and Sprietsma, are reconcilable within this paper’s framework.  
The empirical analysis of preemption cases in this paper further supports the view that the 
case law has a rational basis.  However, the empirical analysis also supports Viscusi’s 
charge with respect to the drug approval process under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act.  For the period of the sample used below (1971-2002), courts appear to be 
unjustifiably reluctant to preempt tort suits involving drugs approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration.  But this appears to be a special case rather than an example of a 
general deficiency in the courts.  
 
 
III. Theory of Preemption Doctrine 
 
A. Error Cost Model 
 
The theoretical issues in preemption analysis are old and were largely dealt with 
in Holmes’s discussion of the jury in The Common Law.18  Holmes asked whether society 
should prefer to have the judge or the jury determine negligence.  Holmes presented a 
model in which the judge decides whether to give the negligence question to the jury.  He 
concluded that in order for the law to become more predictable over time, the judge 
would have to take an increasingly large share of negligence determinations under his 
control.  The jury would be consulted, under Holmes’s scheme, when the judge did not 
                                                 
16 W. Kip Viscusi, Steven R. Rowland, Howard L. Dorfman, Charles J. Walsh, The Effect of Products 
Liability Litigation on Innovation: Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale 
for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1437 (1994). 
17 Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory Compliance Defense, 2 
Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1 (2000). 
18 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.  The Common Law 122-27 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1881).  
Though taking a very different approach from this paper, Robert Rabin noticed the similarity between the 
agency-court question and the judge-jury problem analyzed by Holmes.  See Robert Rabin, Reassessing 
Regulatory Compliance, 88 Geo. L J. 2049 (2000). 
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have enough experience with similar cases to be able to set the optimal standard of care 
on his own.  In these cases, the jury would serve as a source of information on the costs 
and benefits of requiring additional care, and on the state of community norms. 
 
One could describe Holmes’s model as a choice between two decision processes 
for choosing the optimal legal standard, both subject to error.   The jury has an advantage 
in terms of its access to local information and to norms that change over time.  The 
disadvantage of the jury is that it has a higher error variance than does the judge. 
 
The preemption question can be treated as a slightly more complicated version of 
the problem of choosing between judge and jury.  In the preemption case, the choice is 
between letting courts decide the standard of care in each case or letting an agency 
determine it once and for all. 
 
Assume the question is whether a product design should be deemed 
“unreasonably dangerous” on the basis of a comparison of the incremental risk and utility 
the design offers in comparison to a safer alternative.  As courts have noted, this is 
similar to a negligence determination.19  To simplify the analysis, I will assume that the 
risk-utility test is the optimal standard, as well as the common law standard.20  Should 
courts determine the appropriate risk-utility trade off in every individual case, or should 
an agency determine the risk-utility standard once?21 
 
The economic approach to this question compares the sum of expected error and 
administrative costs under the two regimes.  By expected error costs, I mean the expected 
costs of “false convictions” and of “false acquittals.”  This requires an assessment of the 
likelihood of erroneous decisions in favor of the plaintiff or the defendant, and their 
concomitant costs.  The approach I will explain here is similar in some respects to a 
model set out by Shavell,22 but there are substantial differences and the conclusions differ 
too. 
 
The administrative costs under the two regimes (courts versus agency) are easy to 
compare.  Until precedents are set and respected among the individual courts, the case-
by-case system in the courts has higher administrative costs, since it involves many 
                                                 
19 E.g., Volkswagen of Am. v. Young, 321 A.2d 737 (Md. 1974). 
20 For the argument that the common law of products liability has converged, or is in the process of 
converging, on economically optimal legal standards, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A 
Positive Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. Leg. Stud. 535 (1985).  The framework of this paper rejects 
the notion that a simple strict liability rule would be appropriate for all types of products liability claim.  
One reason is that the causation issues that would be generated by such a rule would make it unpracticable. 
21 I do not consider the assumption that agencies use risk-utility analysis as a restrictive one for this model.  
If agencies seek optimal results, the risk-utility standard is a desirable approach.  If agencies do not seek 
optimal results, then the argument for preemption becomes extremely weak and largely uninteresting.  In 
addition, the risk-utility standard builds in the assumption that both agencies and courts evaluate the 
standard on the basis of objective information with respect to risks and potential harms.  This approach 
rejects the notion that policy preferences drive the implementation of the risk utility test.  
22 Shavell, Liability for Harm, supra note 2. 
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determinations of the risk-utility standard rather than one.  Thus, a narrow focus on 
administrative costs favors the agency regime.23 
 
The error costs under the two regimes are ambiguous a priori.  Setting aside error 
probabilities for the moment, it is hard to say whether the actual costs of false acquittals 
are greater than those of false convictions in products liability cases.  False acquittals 
mean that products that are unreasonably dangerous remain on the market, injuring 
consumers.  False convictions mean that products that are not unreasonably dangerous 
are driven from the market by lawsuits, also harming consumers.  Given this ambiguity, I 
see no need to try to separate false-conviction and false-acquittal costs in the analysis 
below.  I will focus on error probabilities. 
 
Consider the error probabilities in products liability litigation.  Three factors 
determine the likelihood of error.  First, the expertise of the agency is a factor that 
suggests that errors are less likely under the agency regime wherever expertise on product 
risk characteristics and utility is valuable in setting the optimal (or common law) 
standard.24  Second, the jury’s superior knowledge of local conditions or norms is a factor 
that suggests errors are less likely under the court regime whenever local knowledge is 
valuable in setting the right standard.25  Third, political distortion is a factor that suggests 
that errors are less likely under the court regime, where the risk of such distortion is 
low.26 
 
By political distortion, I refer to the public choice concerns that enter whenever 
one takes a question away from the jury and puts it in the hands of a government agent.  
Agency officials may come under the influence of the parties whom they are supposed to 
regulate.  In instances where the government agency has come under the influence of the 
regulated firm, the agency’s standard may be biased in favor of the firm. 
 
These three factors – agency expertise, local knowledge, and political distortion – 
do not exhaust the list of factors that could be considered in determining the preemption 
issue.  Society has, in addition, an interest in providing predictability.  A regime that has 
less potential to be accurate ex post may be preferable because it is more predictable ex 
ante.  Consider, for example, the choice between a custom rule and a negligence rule for 
medical malpractice.  However, it is difficult to say how much ex-post accuracy potential 
should be sacrificed in order to gain additional predictability.  For this reason, I will rely 
largely on the three factors identified above.  However, the need for predictability is a tie-
breaking factor that leans (like the desire to minimize administrative costs) in favor of the 
agency regime. 
                                                 
23 Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a “Strong” Regulatory Compliance Defense, 55 Md. L. Rev. 1210 
(1996).  My conclusion (and that of Ausness) differs from that of Shavell, Liability for Harm, supra note 2, 
which argues that administrative costs are lower in the courts. 
24 Shavell, Liability for Harm, supra note 2, at 369. 
25 Id, at 366. 
26 Shavell’s analysis does not take political distortion (or rent seeking) into account.  In addition to this 
important distinction, there are some features of Shavell’s model that are excluded from this analysis (e.g., 
the risk of judgment-proof parties) because they do not improve the model’s ability to explain preemption 
law. 
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The three factors identified here suggest no clear general societal preference for 
the court or agency regime.  Whether tort claims should be preempted by federal 
regulation depends on a weighing of these factors.  It is possible, however, to go further 
and suggest a specific approach to preemption questions. 
 
A finding of preemption should depend largely on two considerations.  First, as a 
threshold matter, was the agency’s determination independent, in the sense that it was not 
overly influenced or biased by some interested party?  If a court finds substantial 
evidence that the agency did not act independently, then it should not find the tort claim 
preempted.  The reason is that political influence, if left unchecked, feeds on itself and 
grows.  If firms know that they can acquire tort immunity by putting themselves under 
phony regulatory regimes, they will bid for this type of protection.  A firm that faces a 
potential tort liability of $5 million would rather invest $4 million in setting up a 
regulatory regime that provides immunity. 
 
The second consideration is the degree of congruence between the agency’s 
standard and the standard that would be used by the court.  This consideration 
encompasses the first two (expertise, local knowledge) of the three factors (expertise, 
local knowledge, political distortion) that influence the overall likelihood of error.  
Superior expertise on the part of the agency should lead the court to favor preemption, 
provided that the agency’s standard is equivalent to that of the common law (which is 
assumed to be optimal).  In contrast, if local knowledge is important in applying the 
common law standard, the fact that the agency employs a standard different from the 
common law should be a sufficient basis to deny preemption. 
 
Time lags are important in determining the degree of congruence between the 
agency’s regulatory standard and the common law standard.  Suppose the agency issues a 
standard in period one, and new risk information arises in period two indicating that the 
agency’s standard is suboptimal.  Since the common law standard would adapt to take the 
new risk information into account, the agency standard would no longer be congruent if it 
did not also adapt to reflect the new information. 
 
B. Examples and Illustrations 
 
Consider some examples to flesh out this argument.  Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standard 208, issued by the Department of Transportation, at one time gave car 
makers options with respect to passive restraint systems.  The agency, from the evidence 
that has emerged, appears to be independent, and it appears to base its standard on a 
weighing of incremental risks and utility, the same factors that would be considered 
under the common law standard in a products liability action.  On the basis of agency 
expertise, this analysis suggests that preemption of state law design-defect claims under 
Standard 208 is desirable.  The state law design-defect claim requires the court to apply 
the same test as that applied by the agency in setting its standard.  Moreover, the agency 
has an advantage in terms of expertise.  A rule of preemption minimizes error under these 
conditions.  It avoids an outcome in which a less expert jury reexamines the methodology 
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of a more expert agency.  However, preemption would be inappropriate under this 
analysis if the defendant seller did not comply with the agency’s regulations or if the 
agency’s standard is not equivalent to the common law standard. 
 
As a second example, consider a nuisance claim.  Nuisance claims, as a general 
rule, require knowledge of local environmental conditions in assessing whether the 
defendant’s conduct constitutes an “unreasonable invasion.”27  In other words, the 
common law standard for nuisances relies on local information.  Given this, there is no 
strong basis for a rule favoring preemption of nuisance claims in a case where a federal 
agency sets a standard that is claimed by defendants to preempt nuisance suits.  For 
example, the 1996 Telecommunications Act appears to preempt nuisance suits based on 
health concerns related to the siting of cell phone towers.28  A court, however, is likely to 
take additional information into account (e.g., nearness of a grade school or hospital, or 
other emission sources) in determining whether a cell phone tower should be deemed a 
nuisance.  Under this paper’s framework, it would be inefficient, as a general rule, to 
preempt nuisance suits under the siting provision of the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 
 
More generally, we can use this framework to predict where products liability 
lawsuits are most likely to be preempted by federal regulation.  Products liability lawsuits 
can be grouped into three types: manufacturing defect, design defect, and failure to warn.  
Manufacturing defect claims cover cases in which the plaintiff is injured because of a 
glitch in the widget production line.  One out of a thousand widgets are made 
dangerously defective by this glitch, and the plaintiff happens to have bought that one in 
one thousand defect.  These claims are governed by strict liability, which means that 
courts forgo any inquiry into the seller’s fault.  Design defect claims cover cases in which 
the plaintiff alleges that the product is unreasonably dangerous because its risks are too 
large relative to its benefits, in comparison to some feasible safer alternative.  These 
claims are governed by “consumer expectation” and “risk-utility” tests – and for 
simplicity I will focus on the risk-utility test.  Failure to warn claims cover cases in which 
the plaintiff sues on a negligence theory for the seller’s failure to provide notice of the 
dangerous attributes of a product. 
 
It follows from the foregoing that, of the three products-liability claim types, 
manufacturing defect claims should be preempted least frequently.  A federal regulatory 
agency could not, without incurring an enormous expense, set a standard governing 
manufacturing glitches that could be used to preempt tort claims efficiently.  Suppose the 
agency were to preempt all tort claims when the glitches occurred at a rate of one per 
thousand or less.  In order to enforce this scheme, the agency would have to monitor the 
production process of every regulated entity, which is infeasible.  If a manufacturing 
defect were to occur, it would be quite difficult for a court to determine ex post whether 
the manufacturer had complied with the agency’s standard, unless government agents had 
monitored the plant so closely that objective records of failure rates could be brought into 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., William L. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts 580-81 (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 4th 
ed. 1971). 
28 Pub. L. No. 104 – 104, § 704, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
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court.  It follows, then, that preemption should be infrequent and generally limited to 
those cases in which government agents regularly inspect regulated entities. 
 
In contrast, error-cost minimization implies that design defect and failure to warn 
claims should be preempted with substantial frequency, under the appropriate conditions.  
If an agency has considered the factors that a court would weigh in conducting a risk-
utility analysis, and concluded that the product is on net beneficial to consumers, then 
courts should defer to the agency’s decision if it is reached in an independent manner.  
However, if the agency is merely rubber stamping the safety standards developed by the 
industry, then it is not acting independently, and the argument for preemption weakens. 
 
There are different degrees of agency independence.  The highest degree of 
independence is observed when the agency’s staffing, methodology, and data are 
invulnerable to bias from industry influence.  Perhaps the closest to this ideal is the Food 
and Drug Administration, which is independent with respect to methodology and staff,29 
but relies on regulated firms to supply data on the effects of new drugs.  Even here, the 
scientific standards governing drug trials are so high that we may just as well treat this as 
a case of independence with respect to data as well.  On the other extreme, one finds the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission, which at least at one time relied on industry to 
design flammable product safety standards.30  Under this paper’s framework, preemption 
should be more probable as the agency’s independence increases – and this will lead to 
differences in observed preemption rates for design and warning claims. 
 
In addition to evidence of agency independence, the frequency with which design 
defect and failure to warn claims will be preempted should be a function of the degree of 
congruence between the regulatory and common law standards.  Congruence is almost 
always satisfied in the case in which the agency determines its standard by weighing risks 
and benefits for every individual product type.  For example, if (as is not the case) the 
Department of Transportation evaluated the risks and benefits of every car design, then 
each regulatory standard governing each car would be determined by a standard that is 
congruent with the common law standard.  On the other hand, where an agency issues a 
generic standard that covers all product types, congruence will be satisfied only if the 
risk-benefit calculus is also generic across product types. 
  
The congruence factor implies that the frequency of preemption should be greater 
in failure to warn cases than in design defect cases.  Risk information issues are often 
generic across product classes.  For example, a warning on the importance of wearing a 
                                                 
29 The FDA forms advisory committees to solicit the opinions of expert scientists and physicians on the 
safety and efficacy of drugs and medical devices.  To encourage the committees’ independence, the FDA 
recruits members from a broad range of qualified candidates.  See, e.g., Dixie Farley, Getting Outside 
Advice for ‘Close Calls’ http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/newdrug/advice.html.  However, since advisory 
committees consist almost entirely of pharmaceutical industry consultants and researchers, some have 
argued that there is considerable scope for the pharmaceutical industry to influence the drug approval 
process.  See, e.g., Dennis Cauchon, FDA Advisers Tied to Industry, USA Today 10A (September 25, 
2000).  On the other hand, interested parties are the ones most likely to be the best informed.  Given this, 
high scientific standards are probably the ultimate guarantee of independence. 
30 See Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 96 F.3d 552 (1st Cir. 1996). 
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seat belt should not depend greatly on the design of the car; similarly, a warning 
governing the risks of smoking cigarettes should not need to vary greatly depending on 
the type of cigarette – at least for most cigarettes commonly marketed.  Questions of 
safety in design, in contrast, are often highly dependent on the type of product.  It is less 
likely, in comparison to warning standards, that an agency will be able to issue a generic 
design safety standard that reflects product-specific risk-utility concerns. 
 
The one factor that cuts against the prediction of a higher rate of preemption in 
failure to warn than in design cases is that of time lags.  Information standards should be 
less costly to revise than design standards.  When new risk information makes the 
original agency standard obsolete, the agency standard loses its congruence with the 
common law standard.  Hence, in comparison to design standards, information standards 
should be revised or at least be capable of being revised more frequently in response to 
new risk information in order to justify preemption. 
 
This approach, in addition to being consistent with error cost minimization, is 
emerging as explicit doctrine in the courts.  I consider some of the cases consistent with 
this approach in the following part. 
 
C. Application to Cases 
 
The model just developed provides a ready explanation for Lohr, as well as the 
Supreme Court’s later treatment of preemption of products liability claims in Geier, 
Sprietsma, and Bates.  Recall that the plaintiff’s pacemaker in Lohr had been exempted 
from the FDA’s pre-market approval process because it was “substantially equivalent” to 
a device that was on the market before 1976. 
 
Under the theory presented here, state law defective design claims should be 
preempted by the MDA in the case of Class III devices that undergo the pre-market 
approval process.  In contrast, the Class III devices that meet the substantial equivalence 
test should not be shielded from liability under preemption doctrine.  The reason is that 
the FDA’s pre-market approval process involves a careful consideration of the risk and 
utility characteristics of the proposed medical device.  These are precisely the issues that 
would be examined by a court under the risk-utility test that would be applied in a 
products liability lawsuit.  Put another way, the federal regulatory standard and the tort 
law standard are congruent.  Since the FDA has greater expertise than a jury, and since 
the issue is one that does not require any special local knowledge of jurors, error costs are 
minimized by preempting design defect claims brought against products that have 
undergone the FDA’s pre-market approval process.  The majority of federal courts have 
found that the MDA preempts such claims.31  
                                                 
31 The Seventh Circuit found that the MDA preempted such a claim in Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 126 F.3d 
902 (7th Cir. 1997); the Eighth Circuit in Martello v. Ciba Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167 (8th Cir. 1994); the 
Fifth Circuit in Martin v. Medtronic, Inc., 254 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2001).  The Sixth Circuit accepted the 
reasoning of these cases in Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216 (6th Cir. 2000).  In Papike v. 
Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 1997), a case involving a Class II medical device (tampons), the 
Ninth Circuit suggested acceptance of the same reasoning.  The only federal appellate court to explicitly 
reject this argument is the Eleventh Circuit in Goodlin v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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In the case of a medical device that is approved under the MDA’s substantial 
equivalence test, these arguments for preemption do not hold.  The substantial 
equivalence test is not congruent to the tort standard.  It does not involve the same 
consideration of risks and benefits as would be undertaken by a court hearing a design 
defect claim.  Since the underlying legal tests are not similar, preemption would be 
inappropriate under this framework. 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Geier can be squared with this framework.  To 
be sure, the fact that it was a five to four decision suggests that the Court may sometimes 
have a destabilizing rather than clarifying effect on tort preemption doctrine.  Still, the 
outcome, a finding that the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 preempts state 
law design defect claims for failure to install an airbag, is entirely consistent with the vast 
majority of federal court decisions, and should be seen in this context as a continuation of 
settled doctrine. 
 
The key result of Geier is that it put more doctrinal distance between current 
preemption law and the express preemption focus of Cipollone.  The Court rejected the 
defendant’s effort to shield itself from tort suits on the basis of Cipollone and the words 
used in the preemption provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.  
The Court pointed to the existence of a “saving” clause – a boilerplate provision in 
federal regulatory statutes that says that compliance with the statute does not exempt 
anyone from liability under common law – as a reason for refusing to find a legislative 
intent to preempt the plaintiff’s claim.  The Court then went on to apply standard conflict 
analysis, and concluded that since the Department of Transportation had considered the 
risk and utility issues that would be analyzed in a common law design defect claim, a 
decision not to preempt would permit state courts to reach conclusions that actually 
conflict with the federal regulatory scheme. 
 
The Court’s description in Geier of the development of Standard 208 suggests 
that preemption is the appropriate result under this paper’s framework.  Standard 208 
appears to have been developed and modified over time independently by the Department 
of Transportation.  It did not result from the agency rubber stamping a privately-
developed industry standard.  To be sure, the auto industry has influence within the 
agency.  However, in the highly publicized setting of auto safety regulation, reputation 
concerns provide a check on the degree to which agency officials will work on behalf of 
the industry.32  No high level agency official with an eye on his political future would 
want to be viewed as having sacrificed public safety to protect auto industry profits.  In 
addition, the department’s level of expertise surpasses that of the typical jury.  There are 
no special local concerns that would justify a decentralized process in which juries decide 
the appropriate level of safety features in car designs.  Since the agency appears to 
develop its rules independently and the jury has no informational advantage, error costs 
are minimized by preempting air bag law suits under Standard 208. 
                                                 
32 Consider the fact that two of the former department heads, William Coleman and Elizabeth Dole, are 
famous political figures who would lose enormous investments in reputational capital if they were seen as 
mere stooges for the auto industry during their tenures as Transportation Secretary. 
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As I noted earlier, the conclusion of Geier seems to be contradicted by that of 
Sprietsma, which rejected the preemption defense.  To see the contradiction, recall that 
Sprietsma held that the Coast Guard’s decision not to require propeller guards did not 
preempt a state law defective design claim based on the absence of a propeller guard.  
The Court argued in Sprietsma that a decision not to impose a uniform propeller guard 
requirement should not preclude a trial court from finding that a propeller guard would be 
desirable in the case of a particular boat design.  The Court argued in Geier that a 
decision not to impose a uniform airbag requirement should preclude a trial court from 
finding that an airbag would be desirable in a particular car design. 
 
The conflict between Geier and Sprietsma is superficial and largely dependent on 
how the decisions are described.  Moreover, the decisions can be reconciled under the 
framework of this paper.  The key difference is that a decision to require airbags in Geier 
would be tantamount to a uniform airbag requirement.  After all, if an airbag would be 
desirable on risk-utility grounds in the car driven by the plaintiff in Geier (a 1987 Honda 
Accord), why would it not be desirable in every other car that has a manual or automatic 
safety belt system – i.e., all other cars? 
 
In a system designed to minimize error costs, there is no reasonable alternative to 
preemption in Geier.  It may sound plausible at first glance to argue, as did the dissenting 
Justices in Geier, that the Department of Transportation’s decision should be treated as a 
minimum that should not preclude an individual court from finding that a particular car 
design was defective because it failed to include an airbag.   But this approach leads to an 
unraveling of the regulatory structure.  If you find one car design defective because it 
fails to include an airbag, there is nothing to prevent you finding that they are all 
defective for the same reason.  And given that the Department of Transportation, an 
expert body, had already weighed the relevant risk-utility factors, any different 
conclusion reached by a jury would probably be erroneous. 
 
The unraveling problem is not clearly suggested by the regulations in Sprietsma.  
The Coast Guard’s decision not to impose a uniform propeller guard requirement was 
based on its conclusion that the risk-utility factors were dependent on the particular boat 
design.  A propeller guard might be desirable for one particular design and undesirable – 
say because it substantially reduced engine speed – for another.  Unraveling is not an 
issue if a finding that one particular boat design is defective because it does not include a 
propeller guard does not imply that all boats without propeller guards are defectively 
designed.33 
 
In terms of the error-cost framework presented here, the different conclusions in 
Geier and Sprietsma can be reconciled on the basis of the similarity between the 
regulatory standard and the common law standard.  Because there were no special design-
                                                 
33 In other words, Sprietsma is defensible only if the unraveling problem is not serious in that case.  In 
interpreting the Coast Guard as having concluded that it was not, the Supreme Court rejected the position 
taken by several lower courts that had looked at the propeller guard issue.  See, e.g., Davis v. Brunswick 
Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1580 (N.D. Georgia 1994). 
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specific features that would have made an airbag appropriate for only one car design, the 
regulatory standard in Geier was a uniform product standard that applied to every car 
design.  The Department had, in effect, considered the same risk-utility factors that would 
be examined by a trial court in a design defect action based on the absence of an airbag.  
The regulatory and the common law standards were congruent. 
 
Spreitsma is not a case in which the regulatory and common law standards were 
congruent.  The Coast Guard had not issued a uniform standard.  It had only decided not 
to issue a uniform standard because design variations made such a standard ineffective.  
The Coast Guard removed itself from the propeller guard question, leaving it to boat 
manufacturers and other regulatory sources to find optimal safety features. 
 
 Bates is easily seen to be consistent with this paper’s framework.  FIFRA sets out 
labeling requirements, and should therefore be viewed as a regulatory standard governing 
the disclosure of information.  Common law on failure to warn is congruent, in the sense 
of this paper’s model, to the FIFRA regulatory standard.  However, design defect claims 
are not congruent to the FIFRA regulatory standard.  The Court’s conclusion that design 
defect claims are not preempted while information-based claims are preempted, to the 
extent they are not parallel with the regulatory standard,34 would be predicted by the 
error-cost model of this paper. 
 
One federal appellate decision that clearly falls within this paper’s framework is 
Judge Boudin’s opinion in Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc.  The plaintiff Wilson 
brought suit against the defendants on failure to warn and negligence theories after her 
daughter was severely burned when her sweatshirt caught fire.  The defendants argued 
that Wilson’s tort claims were preempted by the Flammable Fabrics Act.  The court, after 
examining the history of the federal flammability standard, concluded that it was an 
industry-developed standard that had been adopted without independent testing or 
modification by the Consumer Product Safety Commission.  In Judge Boudin’s view, this 
was enough to decide the case.  Citing Learned Hand’s TJ Hooper opinion for the 
proposition that industry standards should not determine common law negligence 
standards, the court held that Wilson’s claims were not preempted. 
 
The majority of federal court preemption decisions are consistent with the 
analysis in Wilson and this paper’s framework,35 though this is hard to see at first because 
most of them hew closely to analyzing the text of the statute at issue.  Wilson is one of the 
exceptional opinions in which a federal court looks under the layer of statutory text and 
inquires into the function of preemption doctrine.  The Restatement of the Law Third, 
Products Liability, captures the current state of preemption doctrine not with its provision 
on the regulatory compliance defense, section 4(b), but with its comment to that 
provision.  After saying in 4(b) that regulatory compliance does not preclude “a finding 
                                                 
34 Where the information-based claim is parallel to the regulatory requirement, the plaintiff’s tort action is 
not preempted because it is essentially a negligence claim based (failure to warn) on the breach of a 
statutory standard. 
35 See Part IV of this paper (empirical section). 
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of product defect,”36 the Restatement notes in its comment to that provision that a 
regulatory compliance defense may be applicable when the regulation “was promulgated 
recently, … the specific standard addresses the very issue of product design or warning 
presented in the case before the court; and when the court is confident that the 
deliberative process by which the safety standard was established was full, fair, and 
thorough and reflected substantial expertise.”37  The Restatement Third would have come 
closer to describing what federal courts are actually doing if it had inserted the language 
from this comment into provision 4(b). 
 
D. Failure to Warn 
 
This framework’s implications for failure-to-warn cases are straightforward.  The 
common law standard governing failure to warn cases is a negligence test that compares 
the risks that probably would be avoided by a warning with the cost of a warning.  If the 
federal regulatory agency that oversees product labeling examines the same issues in 
determining whether a warning should be required, and no new risks materialize after the 
federal standard is issued, then the federal regulatory standard is congruent with the 
common law standard.  Congruence, under this framework, is a necessary condition for 
preemption of failure to warn claims. 
 
Some statutes, notably the MDA and FIFRA, require a federal agency to regulate 
product labeling in order to safeguard health.  In many of these cases the agency’s 
standard is congruent with the common law standard. 
 
For example, the FDA has the authority under the MDA to classify products 
according to whether they pose slight (Class I), moderate (Class II), or serious risk to 
human health (Class III).  For products in the serious risk category (Class III), the FDA 
examines the seller’s proposed product under its “pre-market approval process,” which 
requires the seller to submit a detailed application which is reviewed by a panel of 
experts.38  For the products in the moderate risk category (Class II), the FDA has the 
authority to require warnings and product specifications (e.g., performance standards, 
post-market monitoring) if it considers the health risks substantial39 – and courts have 
interpreted this statutory grant of authority to mean that the agency has the primary 
responsibility to determine the risks that need to be revealed to the consumer and how 
those risks should be reported.40 
 
In view of the FDA’s charge under the MDA – to protect the public health by 
assuring that medical devices are safe and effective41 – and the comprehensiveness of the 
pre-market approval process, one should expect the agency to require warnings for Class 
III devices in every instance in which it would be negligent not to require one and 
                                                 
36 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b) (1998). 
37 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4 cmt. e (1998). 
38 See, e.g. Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1419 (5th Cir. 1993). 
39 Id. at 418. 
40 Id. at 1421. 
41 See, e.g., Stewart v. International Playtex, 672 F.Supp. 907, 909 (D.S.C. 1987); Brooks v. Howmedica 
Inc., 236 F.3d 956, 965 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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perhaps in other instances as well.  In addition, there are no local concerns that would 
lead one to think that a jury would be able to bring any special knowledge to the 
determination of an appropriate warning.  Given this, substituting the decision of a court 
over that of the agency increases the likelihood of error.  The same can be said of Class II 
devices, though the likelihood of preemption should be lower for them than for Class III 
devices since they are approved under a less rigorous process. 
 
In the cases of both the MDA and FIFRA, there are expert agencies (FDA in the 
former, EPA in the latter) applying a standard that is congruent with the common law 
standard to a problem of risk regulation that does not require the input of special local 
concerns.  This paper’s framework predicts that courts should find state tort actions for 
failure to warn preempted under these conditions, which is what one finds (see appendix 
Table A2).  The interesting question is why some claims are not preempted. 
 
One exception in which failure to warn claims are not preempted even though the 
federal regulatory standard is congruent with the common law standard is when the seller 
fails to comply with the regulatory standard.42  When the seller fails to comply with the 
regulatory standard, a decision against preemption is equivalent to holding the seller 
liable for failing to meet the regulatory standard. 
 
The failure to warn cases also provide instances in which the federal regulatory 
standard does not appear to be congruent with the common law standard.  The model 
presented here predicts that the preemption rate should be low, which appears to be true. 
 
For example, consider failure to warn claims involving products regulated by the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).  In reviewing proposed labels for drugs, the 
FDCA does not require the FDA to apply the sort of rigorous review required under the 
MDA for Class III medical devices.  Indeed, the original purpose of review under the 
FDCA was to prevent the “misbranding” of drugs,43 not to establish a uniform regime for 
determining the risks that must be conveyed to consumers.  FDCA regulations explicitly 
allow for sellers to modify labels as new risk information comes to light. 
 
Given the differences between the FDCA and MDA, the level of congruence 
between the common law standard and the regulatory standard is generally lower in the 
case of the FDCA.  There is a wider variance in regulatory standards under the FDCA 
than under the MDA.  Animal drugs, for example, are approved under a process in which 
the agency takes a passive approach.  Post approval monitoring is less frequent than 
under the MDA.  There is a higher likelihood in this regime that a seller could negligently 
fail to modify a label to reflect new risk information that comes to light after its product 
is approved for marketing.  
 
A general rule that approval of a product label under the FDCA immediately 
implies preemption of tort claims would be inconsistent with this paper’s framework.  In 
                                                 
42 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Natl. Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 
F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 1994). 
43 See Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, Inc., 825 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1987). 
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fact, the rate of preemption under the FDCA is low (see appendix Table A2).  However, 
this can be taken as no more than weak confirmation of the framework at best.  Many of 
the FDCA cases are decided on the basis of precedent without much discussion of the 
underlying purpose of preemption doctrine.  The rate of preemption is too low, given that 
there are cases (e.g., vaccines) in which the FDA’s process under the FDCA is 
indistinguishable from its process under the MDA. 
 
E. Failure to Comply with the Regulatory Standard Generally and Fraud on 
the Agency 
 
While failure to comply with the regulatory standard is often cited as a potential 
reason for denying preemption (and for imposing liability as well), the effect of an 
allegation that the defendant failed to comply with the regulatory standard is mixed.  A 
substantial number of products liability claims are preempted even though the plaintiff 
claims that the defendant failed to comply with the regulatory standard. 
 
This framework suggests a reason why a claim that the defendant failed to comply 
with the regulatory standard does not generally lead to a denial of preemption.  The core 
of the explanation is the ease with which a court can determine compliance with the 
regulatory standard.  If a court can determine failure to comply with the regulatory 
standard easily, then there is no great risk of error when a court holds a defendant liable 
for failing to comply.44 
 
On the other hand, if the court cannot easily determine failure to comply with the 
regulatory standard, there is a great risk of error when a court denies a defendant’s 
preemption claim.  If the regulatory agency has not itself determined that the defendant 
breached its standard, then permitting such a claim to be litigated would subject the 
agency to second-guessing in court.  Of course, it is a different case if the agency has 
determined that the plaintiff failed to comply with its standard.45 
 
There is a special type of failure to comply known as “fraud on the agency.”  In 
these cases, a plaintiff argues against preemption on the ground that although the 
defendant complied with the agency’s regulatory standard, that standard itself was biased 
                                                 
44 The only reason a court would not hold a defendant liable is that the plaintiff’s claim has no counterpart 
in the common law.  For example, if the common law says clearly that the defendant owes no duty of care 
toward the plaintiff, the court should not hold the defendant liable for a breach of a regulatory standard. 
45 This argument suggests that an alleged failure to comply is more likely, other things being equal, to lead 
to a rejection of the preemption defense in the failure to warn case than in the design defect case.  Failure to 
comply with an agency’s labeling requirement is usually easy to determine.  The court can read the 
agency’s labeling requirement just as well as anyone else, and can easily spot a failure to comply.  
However, this is not so often true of design defect claims.  Regulatory design standards are sometimes 
detailed and complicated, in other instances as vague as the common law negligence standard.  For a court 
to determine whether the defendant complied would be equivalent in these cases to second guessing the 
agency’s determination.  In the case of an expert, independent agency, this approach increases the 
likelihood of error.  This argument suggests that courts should be quicker to deny the preemption defense in 
failure to warn cases because the risk of error is lower.  There were too few cases involving allegations of 
noncompliance and to perform a reliable test of this claim.  However, my sample provides some weak 
support for this hypothesis, see note 67, infra. 
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as a result of the defendant’s submission of fraudulent information.  For example, a 
plaintiff might urge, under this theory, that a court not find his claim against a medical 
device seller preempted by the MDA when there is evidence that the seller’s product was 
approved for marketing on the basis of false information given by the defendant to the 
FDA. 
 
From an error-cost minimization perspective, there is a strong argument against 
preempting a plaintiff’s tort claim when the defendant supplied false information to the 
agency, the agency relied on that information in setting its standard, and the resulting 
standard was biased as a result.  In this case there is no basis for believing that the agency 
standard is more accurate than the court-determined standard.  Moreover, finding 
preemption in this case encourages firms to defraud regulatory agencies in order to gain 
immunity from effective regulation and from tort suits. 
 
The difficulty in applying this approach is that it leaves little of the preemption 
rule intact.  Every plaintiff who can find evidence to support the claim that the defendant 
supplied false information to the agency will assert it.  If courts had to determine the 
validity of the plaintiff’s assertion in each case, there would be relatively little left of the 
preemption rule.  Instead of directly substituting the agency’s standard with the court’s 
standard, this approach leads to an indirect substitution that occurs through litigating over 
the existence and effect of the defendant’s alleged fraud. 
 
While relying on a different rationale, the Supreme Court rejected the “fraud on 
the agency” theory as an exception to preemption doctrine in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ 
Leg. Comm.46  The majority opinion noted that a fraud exception would distort the 
incentives of product sellers who approach the FDA for approval, since they would be 
aware that approval might not shield them from tort litigation for failing to comply with 
the plaintiff’s hypothetical version of the true agency standard.  Justice Stevens’s 
concurring opinion in Buckman argued that the plaintiff’s claim should not be preempted 
in a case in which the agency itself had determined that the seller had acted fraudulently 
and had taken action to correct the regulatory error. 
 
The position taken in the Stevens concurrence seems the most consistent with the 
framework of this paper.  If tort claims are limited to those “fraud on the agency” cases in 
which the agency has actually determined that the seller acted fraudulently and taken 
action to correct the fraud, then there is little risk that the fraud exception will swallow a 
large part of the preemption rule.  Under these conditions, only a small number of 
plaintiffs will be able to take advantage of the fraud exception.  In addition, given the risk 
that the sanctions imposed by an agency may be insufficient to deter fraud, tort liability 
provides reliable compliance incentives by internalizing the harms caused by the seller’s 
fraud. 
 
While Buckman did not explicitly reject the existence of a fraud exception in the 
case in which the agency itself has determined that the seller acted fraudulently, its 
analysis, which is centered on the argument that state tort law has little interest in 
                                                 
46 531 U.S. 341 (2001). 
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protecting federal agencies from fraud, leaves little room for it.  The flaw in Buckman’s 
broad rejection of the fraud theory is that it encourages the very sellers who would 
attempt to defraud an agency to lobby the legislature to weaken the agency’s enforcement 
tools.  If fraudulent sellers can be sure that the sanctions for fraud will be limited to those 
imposed by the federal regulatory agency, they will have incentives to seek legislation 
and administrative orders that constrain agency sanctions against fraud.  The long run 
result could be an increase in fraudulent applications.  In short, there is nothing in the 
Buckman approach to constrain the costs of political distortion, a factor that must always 
be taken into account in the regulatory setting. 
 
F. Summary of Implications 
 
The implications of the error-cost model can be summarized as follows.  First, the 
likelihood that a plaintiff’s products liability claim (design defect, failure to warn, or 
manufacturing defect) will be preempted increases with the degree of congruence 
between the agency’s standard and the common law.  Second, the likelihood of 
preemption increases with the perceived independence and rigor of the agency’s review 
process.  Third, preemption is more likely in failure to warn than in design defect claims.  
Fourth, preemption is unlikely in manufacturing defect claims.  Fifth, preemption is 
unlikely when the defendant has failed to comply with the agency’s standard.47  
However, where there is a mere allegation of noncompliance preemption may result 
because of the court’s concern for the risk of error.  Similarly, where there is an 
allegation of fraud on the agency, preemption is likely to be the result given the risk of 
court error.  I have argued that the case law is consistent with these predictions.  The 
remaining part of this paper looks for evidence to support these claims in a regression 
model. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
A. Data and Model 
 
To this point I have argued that the modern preemption case law is consistent with 
an approach that seeks to minimize the costs of error.  In this part I will examine the 
empirical evidence that preemption doctrine has always been consistent with this 
approach.  This part will try to identify the factors that are most important in explaining 
the results of the preemption cases. 
 
Table 1 provides a summary of the results from federal and state products liability 
preemption cases, running from the 1970s to 2002.48  The table reports the number of 
                                                 
47 The sample of cases, discussed in the next section, includes no cases in which there was a finding that the 
defendant failed to comply with the agency standard (if such cases existed, they probably settled before 
trial).  As a result, the fifth claim cannot be tested directly.  However, there are many cases involving 
allegations of noncompliance. 
48 The first state case is from 1971, the first federal case is from 1976.  Both federal and state samples run 
up to 2002.  To gather the cases, I performed identical searches on Westlaw and Lexis using general search 
terms relating to preemption (e.g., "federal preemption of state law claims"), using both "natural language" 
and "terms and connectors" searches.  Within the extensive search results that came up, I ignored cases 
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cases and the number of claims, since an individual case can involve more than one claim 
that a court must decide whether to bar on the basis of preemption.  Each case in the table 
is either a trial or appellate court decision. 
 
The sample described in Table 1 excludes United States Supreme Court cases.  
The reason is that the Supreme Court operates with fewer constraints than the lower 
courts.  As the Cipollone experience illustrates, the Court has shown a willingness in the 
preemption area to strike off in a new direction, radically changing settled doctrine.49  
Given this, the most accurate statistical picture of the doctrine is provided by the bulk of 
cases meandering through the lower courts.  In any event, excluding U.S. Supreme Court 
products liability preemption decisions reduces the sample by only five cases for this 
period. 
 
Table 1 shows that federal courts are considerably more likely to find preemption 
than are state courts.  Of the total claims, federal courts found 61 percent preempted 
while state courts found 42 percent preempted.50  For failure to warn claims, federal court 
preemption rate is 74 percent, while the state court preemption rate is 53 percent, which 
is statistically significant at the conventional five percent level.51  For design defect 
claims, the federal and state court preemption rates are 46 and 34 respectively.  This 
difference is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 1 also shows that the preemption rate for failure to warn claims is 
substantially larger than that for design defect.   For example, the overall preemption rate 
in the sample for failure to warn claims in federal court is 74 percent, while that for 
design defect claims in federal court is 46 percent, a statistically significant difference.52 
 
The high preemption rate for failure to warn cases confirms one prediction of the 
“error cost” framework set out previously in this paper.  The model predicts that failure to 
warn cases should have a relatively high preemption rate because it is easier for 
regulatory agencies to issue a generic safety standard in the risk assessment context.  Risk 
assessment issues tend to be generic across a product line – i.e., not varying by individual 
brand.  Given their generic quality, warning standards will frequently be congruent with 
the test applied by a court examining a failure to warn claim brought against the 
                                                                                                                                                 
relating only to ERISA.  The cases that came from this initial search were shepardized, and additional cases 
were added as a result.  Finally, when reading cases, if a case was cited that had not otherwise turned up in 
initial search stages, I added that case to the sample. 
49 As another example of this willingness to deviate from settled law, consider Geier, which was a 5-4 
decision.  Given that Geier is entirely consistent with prior law, as reflected in the vast majority of 
appellate court decisions, it is surprising that four justices voted against the majority’s decision. 
50 This difference is statistically significant at the ten percent level and almost significant at the more 
conventional five percent level.  Under the hypothesis that federal and state courts are equally likely to find 
a claim preempted, the preemption rate should come to 55 percent in both systems (take the sum of 156 and 
50, and divide by the sum of 255 and 120).  The chi-squared statistic is [(61-55)2 + (42-55)2]/55 = 3.73, 
which, at one degree of freedom, is close to the five percent significance threshold of 3.84. 
51 The chi-squared statistic is [(74-68)2 + (53-68)2]/68 = 3.84, which, at one degree of freedom, is (just) 
significant at the five percent level. 
52 The chi-squared statistic is [(74-61)2 + (46-61)2]/61 = 6.46, which at one degree of freedom is 
statistically significant at the one percent level.  
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manufacturer of a specific product.  A higher degree of congruence between the 
regulatory and court standards implies a higher rate of preemption under the framework, 
which is confirmed in Table 1.  This is different from the case of design defects, which 
often vary within a product line depending on the particular brand of the product 
(convertible car versus sport-utility vehicle), making it less likely that the regulatory 
standard will be congruent with the common law standard. 
 
There are too few manufacturing defect claims to offer a useful statistical 
comparison of preemption rates.  Of the three manufacturing defect claims in the federal 
sample, two were preempted.  Both of the manufacturing defect claims in the state 
sample were preempted.  However, closer inspection reveals that even within this small 
sample, the outcomes are consistent with the argument of the previous part of this paper, 
which predicted a low preemption rate because of low congruence levels.  Both of the 
preempted federal claims were decided on special grounds unrelated to the degree of 
congruence between the regulatory and common law standards.53  
 
 
                                                 
53 One claim was preempted on the basis of a broad reading of Cippolone; the other on the basis of a special 
provision for investigational devices in the MDA. 
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TABLE 1 
 
 FEDERAL STATE 
    TOTALS 
Total # Cases 200 99 
Total # Claims 255 120 
Total # Preempted 156 (61%) 50 (42%) 
Total # Not Preempted 99 (39%) 70 (58%) 
   
    BY CLAIM TYPE 
FAILURE TO WARN 
Total # Claims 133 51 
Preempted 99 (74%) 27 (53%) 
Not Preempted 34 (26%) 24 (47%) 
   
DESIGN DEFECT 
Total # Claims 119 67 
Preempted 55 (46%) 23 (34%) 
Not Preempted 64 (54%) 44 (66%) 
   
MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
Total # Claims 3 2 
Preempted 2 (67%) 0 
Not Preempted 1 (33%) 2(100%) 
 
. 
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Table 2 shows the preemption outcomes broken down by claim and by period.  I 
divided the periods into pre-Cipollone, Cipollone to Lohr, and post-Lohr.  In the failure 
to warn cases, both federal and state, one sees a sharp increase in the preemption rate in 
the Cipollone period, which remains high in the post-Lohr period as well.  The 
preemption rate for failure to warn claims in the federal case sample jumped from 60 
percent in the pre-Cipollone period to 87 percent in the Cipollone period, a statistically 
significant difference.54  In the state courts, the preemption rate for failure to warn claims 
jumped from 12.5% to 77%.  Over the Cipollone period many courts, following the 
Supreme Court’s lead, found state products liability claims preempted on the basis of a 
legislative intent inferred from words used in federal regulatory statutes. 
 
Table 2 suggests that Cipollone led to different results in the federal and state 
design defect cases.  For design defect claims in federal courts, the preemption rate is 
roughly the same in the pre-Cipollone and Cipollone periods (50 percent and 47 percent 
respectively).  In the state cases, however, the preemption rate jumps from 12.5 percent 
pre-Cipollone to 36 percent in the period between Cipollone and Lohr, which is 
statistically significant.55  The fact that the preemption rate for design defect claims 
remained unchanged in the federal cases after Cipollone is inconsistent with academic 
commentary at the time predicting important consequences for preemption law in 
general.  In the federal courts, Cipollone’s immediate impact appears to have been 
limited to the failure to warn cases.  Of course, the sample of state design defect cases 
may be too small to justify any confident conclusions about the difference in Cipollone’s 
impact on state and federal courts.  
 
Setting the sample size concern aside, what would explain Cipollone’s apparently 
different effects on federal and state design defect cases?  The difference is probably 
attributable to the approaches to preemption taken by federal and state courts.  By the 
time of the Cipollone decision, federal courts had already begun to develop a body of 
preemption law governing design defect cases.  State courts, however, had for the most 
part adhered to a strong anti-preemption preference as a rule of statutory interpretation.  
The Supreme Court rejected the anti-preemption preference in Cipollone, which had a 
much greater impact on state than on federal courts. 
 
An alternative explanation for Cipplone’s different effects on state and federal 
preemption rates could be based on settlement activity – or “selection effects.”56  No 
doubt settlement incentives are affecting the sample preemption rates in both federal and 
state courts.  But the selection effects story seems an unlikely explanation.   To rely on 
selection effects, one would have to believe that trial selection incentives differ in state 
and federal courts, which seems implausible. 
                                                 
54 This difference is statistically significant at the five percent level.  The chi-squared (one degree of 
freedom) statistic for this difference is 5. 
55 The chi-squared statistic is [(12.5-30)2 + (36-30)2]/30 = 11.41, which, at one degree of freedom, is 
statistically significant at the one percent level. 
56 See George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Leg. Studies 1, 
1984; Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. Leg. 
Studies 187 (1993). 
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Whatever the reason for the difference in Cipollone’s impact in state and federal 
courts, the state and federal preemption rates for design defect claims converge in the 
post-Lohr period.  The preemption rate for design defect claims in federal court is 43 
percent in the post-Lohr period, and the state preemption rate is 38 percent.  This 
difference is not statistically significant.  While this seems to suggest convergence of 
state and federal law on preemption of design defect claims, the figures in Table 2 are 
insufficient to support such a conclusion.  The regression analysis below will suggest that 
there has been, at most, a weak convergence of state and federal preemption law on 
design defect claims.57 
 
B. Regression Analysis 
 
1. Variables and Model 
 
Recall that this framework points to two key factors as determinants of the 
likelihood of preemption: agency independence and the level of congruence between the 
agency’s regulatory standard and the common law standard.  In order to subject the 
model to a more rigorous test I set up a Probit model for determining the probability of 
preemption for a particular claim.  The model uses dummy variables for the particular 
agency and statute to control for the agency’s process (e.g., agency independence, agency 
expertise).  The model also uses dummy variables that code for the level of congruence 
between the agency’s standard and the common law standard. 
 
The congruence variable distinguishes four classes or types.  Congruence Level 
One applies to all claims for which the agency’s regulatory standard fails to impose any 
product-specific requirements that govern the plaintiff’s claim.  The simplest example 
would be a regulation that merely classifies or identifies a product without imposing any 
requirement on the seller whatsoever.58  Another example is the substantial equivalence 
test under the MDA, under which the FDA approves a medical device for marketing as 
long as it is no more dangerous or less effective than an earlier comparable device. 
 
Congruence Level Two applies to all claims for which the agency’s regulatory 
standard imposes only generic minimum product standards.  Several regulatory statutes 
are understood as setting out generic minimum safety standards for products.  For 
example, the FAA (Federal Aviation Act), FBSA (Federal Boat Safety Act), CAA (Clean 
Air Act), FDCA (Food Drug and Cosmetics Act) all fall in this category. 
                                                 
57 The reader may ask why I have not also looked for evidence of convergence in the failure to warn claims.  
There is no need because there is no suggestion in Table 2 that the effects of Cipollone were different in the 
state and federal courts with respect to the failure to warn claims.  Cipollone caused a substantial jump in 
preemption rates for both federal and state failure to warn claims. 
58 Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F.Supp. 948 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
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TABLE 2 
 
 1972 – Cipollone 
(6/24/92) 
Cipollone – Lohr 
(6/26/96) 
Lohr – 2002 
            
FAILURE TO WARN 
Federal:    
   Total # Claims    47   38    48 
   Preempted    29 (60%)   33 (87%)    37 (77%) 
   Not Preempted    18 (40%)   5 (13%)    11 (23%) 
State:    
   Total # Claims    8   13    30 
   Preempted    1 (12.5%)   10 (77%)    16 (53%) 
   Not Preempted    7 (87.5%)   3 (23%)    14 (47%) 
    
DESIGN DEFECT 
Federal:    
   Total # Claims    42   32    45 
   Preempted    21 (50%)   15 (47%)    19 (42%) 
   Not Preempted    21 (50%)   17 (53%)    26 (58%) 
State:    
   Total # Claims    8   22    37 
   Preempted    1 (12.5%)   8 (36%)    14 (38%) 
   Not Preempted    7 (87.5%)   14 (64%)    23 (62%) 
    
MANUFACTURING DEFECT 
Federal:    
   Total # Claims    0   1    2 
   Preempted:    0   1 (100%)    1 (50%) 
   Not Preempted    0   0    1 (50%) 
State:    
   Total # Claims    1     1 
   Preempted    0     0 
   Not Preempted    1 (100%)     1 (100%) 
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Congruence Level Three applies to claims for which the agency’s regulatory 
standard imposes a menu of options.  This applies to only one statute and one agency: the 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (NTMVSA) and the Department of 
Transportation, respectively.  In particular, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 
(FMVSS) 208 provided car manufacturers with the option to choose between safety belts 
and air bag systems.   The menu-of-options standard applies to only the subset of 
NTMVSA cases involving FMVSS 208.  There are other cases, examining other safety 
standards imposed under the NTMVSA, that do not involve menu-of-options style 
standards. 
 
Congruence Level Four applies to claims for which the agency’s regulatory 
standard exhibits the greatest degree of product specificity.  These are claims for which 
the agency’s regulatory standard comes very close to, if not being identical with, the 
common law standard governing the plaintiff’s claim.  For example, if the plaintiff’s 
claim is a design defect claim and the agency’s standard requires it to examine the risk 
and utility features of every product design, then the claim would fall within the 
“congruence level four” category.  Design defect claims involving Class III medical 
devices – devices that have been subjected to the FDA’s rigorous pre-market approval 
process – are generally in this category. 
 
Table 3 provides definitions of the variables used in the regression analysis.59  
The agencies and statutes are related, as shown in the appendix Table A1.60  Because of 
this, it was impossible to control for all of the agencies and all of the statutes at the same 
time in the regression analysis.  For example, the fact that the Department of 
Transportation implements safety regulations under five statutes in this sample 
(Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA), Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA), 
Federal Boat Safety Act (FBSA), National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act 
(NTMVSA), Federal Aviation Act (FAA)) implies that it would be impossible (due to 
collinearity) to include in one regression dummy variables for all five statutes and the 
agency as well. 
 
 2. Interpretation Issues 
 
In the probit regressions below, I have assumed that the independent or 
explanatory variables have an impact consistent with the theory set out in this paper on 
the probability that a claim is found preempted by a court.  One difficulty with this 
approach is that we observe preemption only within the sample of litigated cases.  Since 
the litigated cases are not a random sample of all of the disputes in which preemption is 
                                                 
59 The single equation Probit regressions are based on an assumption that the variables listed in Table 3 are 
exogenous.  This seems defensible.  For example, the claim type variables (e.g., DESDEF, FAILWARN) 
are the clearest candidates for endogeneity.  But plaintiffs are likely to assert every plausible (or 
nonfrivolous) theory of liability, irrespective of the associated probability of preemption. 
60 One special case shown in the table is that of Section 211 of the Clean Air Act.  Although the Clean Air 
Act is administered by the EPA, I have linked Section 211 to Congress.  The reason is that the two CAA 
claims in the sample involve a question of preemption under Section 211, not any particular agency rules or 
practices. 
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an issue, the estimated relationship between the likelihood of preemption and the 
independent variables may be biased by litigants’ decisions to settle or litigate. 
 
To see this, suppose Pp is the probability that a claim is preempted.  The 
regression model assumes Pp is impacted by the independent variables in Table 3.  
Suppose Pplit is the probability that a litigated case is preempted.  While the basic theory 
leads to predictions on the relationship between Pp and the independent variables, we 
observe only Pplit .  If the probability of settlement is Ps, the relationship between Pp and 
Pplit is Pp = (1-Ps)Pplit, or 
 
)1( s
plit
p P
P
P −= . 
 
This implies that as long as the variables that are hypothesized to influence Pp also 
influence the settlement probability Ps, any attempt to estimate the marginal impact of 
one of the variables on the preemption likelihood may be biased by its impact on 
settlement. 
 
The “sample selection” bias identified here is a general problem that applies to 
any attempt to use court decisions in a regression analysis.  The general way to control 
for this type of bias is to use information on settled cases,61 but my sample is one of 
reported cases and does not contain this information.  One might think that the problem 
could be avoided easily by not conducting an empirical investigation, but the problem is 
present even in analyses that simply discuss reported cases. 
 
Given the possibility of sample selection bias, the probit regression results below 
must be interpreted with care.  The regression estimates are reliable tests of the theory set 
out earlier in this paper if the marginal impacts of the independent variables in Table 3 on 
the settlement decision are negligible.  On the other hand, one could interpret the results 
as measuring the effects of the independent variables within the sample of litigated 
cases.62  In this case the estimated coefficients reflect a combination of direct effects on 
the preemption probability and effects on settlement, which is more difficult to interpret.  
The discussion below adopts the former interpretation.  
 
Again it is important to stress that the settlement bias problem cannot be avoided 
in a sample that relies on reported court opinions.  Moreover, the problem exists whether 
one does an empirical analysis or a less formal discussion of the case law.  Given this, the 
regression analysis below should be viewed as another way of discussing the case law – a 
way that makes greater use of the sample and allows one to make consistent comparisons 
within the sample. 
                                                 
61 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and 
Compensation for Bodily Injury, 15 J. Legal Stud. 321 (1986). 
62 Even if the marginal impacts of the independent variables on settlement decisions are not trivial, the 
results reported below still contain useful information concerning the theory of this paper.  If the results are 
consistent with the theory presented earlier, they suggest that offsetting or countervailing settlement-bias 
effects are not so large that they overwhelm the hypothesized effects of the independent variables. 
 29
 
C. Federal Court Sample 
 
The first set of regression results are given in Table 4.  The data are from federal 
cases only.  The results in Table 4 include controls only for the agencies, not for the 
statutes.  Still, the regression model viewed in its entirety performs relatively well, with 
an R-squared statistic of 44 percent. 
 
The only agency variables that are statistically significant in Table 4 are those for 
the Coast Guard, which implements regulations under the Federal Boat Safety Act, and 
Congress, which is not an agency but is the body that wrote the Federal Cigarette 
Labeling Act and Section 211 of the Clean Air Act.  The agency variables should be 
understood as measuring impact relative to the Environmental Protection Agency – the 
variable which was excluded from this regression in order to avoid collinearity.  Because 
this regression makes no attempt to control for statute effects, the “Congress” coefficient 
should be understood as reflecting the impact of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and 
Advertising Act (FCLAA) – in other words, the two effects cannot be distinguished in 
this regression. 
 
The positive and significant COASTGUARD effect provides some support to 
this paper’s claim that agency independence has played an important role in preemption 
analysis.  To be sure, this result reflects past experience, in which the Coast Guard’s 
regulations under the FBSA have been given preemptive effect by the vast majority of 
courts.  This is unlikely to remain after the Sprietsma decision.  But the Coast Guard 
effect appears to have been powerful, given that all of the FBSA claims involved (and 
indeed were described by deciding courts as involving) only minimum safety standard 
regulations (congruence level two). 
 
The core of this paper’s thesis is tested and validated by the results for the 
congruence level variables.  Those results show that the probability of preemption 
increases as one moves from congruence level one (excluded from the regression) to 
congruence level four.  Using congruence level one (no binding regulations) as the base 
for comparison, the regression results show that the probability of preemption increases 
by .55 if the congruence level is changed from one to two (minimum standards).  The 
preemption probability increases by roughly .56 if the congruence level is changed from 
one to three (menu of options).  The preemption probability increases by .75 if the 
congruence level is changed from one to four (product specific regulations). 
 
The variable DESDEF, which codes for whether the plaintiff’s claim is a 
defective design, has a negative and statistically significant coefficient of -.268.  This 
means that if you hold constant case and court characteristics, a defective design claim is 
less likely to be preempted than a failure to warn claim.  This confirms one of the 
predictions of the error-cost framework: that regulations governing information provision 
to consumers are more likely to preempt state tort claims than are design regulations.  
The reason is that optimal information-provision standards are more likely to be generic 
across product type – e.g., a seat belt warning is unlikely to vary depending on the type of 
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car.   This, in turn, implies the degree of congruence between the common law standard 
and the regulatory standard should be greater.63 
 
The result for the variable MANDEF, which codes for whether the plaintiff 
asserts a manufacturing defect theory, is inconsistent with the error cost model of this 
paper.  The model predicts a negative coefficient, because it is extremely costly for an 
agency to design an enforceable regulatory standard governing manufacturing defects.  
However, Table 4 reports a positive coefficient of .28.  The result is attributable to the 
small number of manufacturing defect claims in the sample (three).  As I noted earlier, 
two of the claims were preempted on special grounds unrelated to the degree of 
congruence between the regulatory and common law standards. 
 
The court level variable, COURTLEV, which distinguishes cases decided by 
appellate courts, shows that the probability of preemption increases by a marginally 
significant .14 if the deciding court is an appellate court (though this variable was 
insignificant in the subsequent regression reported in Table 5).  The positive result for 
COURTLEV is to be expected, given that preemption is a question of law, and the 
primary role of appellate courts is to ensure that lower courts remain consistent with the 
law. 
 
The remaining significant coefficients from the Table 4 are those for PERIOD1, 
which codes for the pre-Cipollone time period, and PERIOD3, which codes for post-
Lohr time period.  Both are negative, indicating that the probability of preemption is 
lower in both periods than in the Cipollone period.  This result is consistent with the 
summary data reported in Table 2, which show the highest preemption rates during the 
Cipollone period.  The preemption rate has fallen after the Cipollone period, but not to 
the level observed before Cipollone. 
 
The key contribution of the PERIOD variables, above what was conveyed by the 
summary data in Table 2, is to show that even after controlling for case and court 
characteristics, the Cipollone decision appears to have had a big impact on preemption 
law.  To be sure, much of the impact was short-lived, since implied preemption theory 
has overtaken express preemption theory as the dominant approach in the federal courts 
today.  However, the lasting effect of Cipollone was to permanently reverse the 
presumption against preemption adopted by many courts before Cipollone. 
 
The insignificant coefficient for COMPLIED shows that an alleged failure to 
comply with the agency’s standard does not significantly reduce the probability that the 
plaintiff’s claim will be preempted.  This is consistent with this paper’s framework.  
                                                 
63One might argue that congruence with the common law standard is insufficient by itself to explain the 
significant coefficient on DESDEF.  Since the regression already controls for degree of congruence, one 
might think that the coefficient for DESDEF should be zero.  However, the congruence variables code for 
different levels of product specificity in regulations.  A precise measure of congruence is unattainable.  
Information standards differ from product-design standards in the sense that product specificity may not be 
a necessary feature of an optimal information rule.  The negative DESDEF coefficient (alternatively, the 
positive effect of a failure-to-warn claim classification) may be capturing the effect of cases in which the 
optimal information standard is generic rather than product specific.  
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Recall that in order to evaluate an alleged failure to comply in some defective-design 
cases, a court would have to replicate the agency’s regulatory process.  The weak impact 
of an allegation of failure to comply suggests that federal courts are reluctant to engage in 
second guessing the agency’s process – which avoids errors generated by having a less-
expert court review the actions of a more-expert agency.  Federal courts are putting a 
high evidentiary burden on plaintiffs who claim that the defendant failed to comply with 
the agency’s regulation. 
 
Similarly, the statistically weak coefficient for FRAUD, which codes for cases in 
which the plaintiff presents a fraud-on-the-agency theory, indicates reluctance on the part 
of federal courts to second guess agency processes.  Indeed, the positive estimate for the 
FRAUD variable suggests that courts may be more likely to preempt the plaintiff’s claim 
when he asserts a fraud-on-the-agency theory.  This is also consistent with this paper’s 
framework.  Fraud-on-the-agency claims demand a serious incursion on the part of the 
court into the agency’s process.  Courts sensitive to the error costs generated by such an 
approach would be reluctant to accept these demands. 
 
Table 5 reports results from a regression that controls for statute effects.64  In this 
regression, the excluded statute is FIFRA, so the results should be understood as 
capturing the statute’s effect in comparison to FIFRA.  For the variables describing claim 
characteristics (e.g., type of claim and congruence level), the results are largely the same 
as in the previous regression which controlled for agency effects.65 
 
The significant statute variables are those coding for the FCLAA (Federal 
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act), FBSA (Federal Boat Safety Act), FDCA (Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act), FHSA (Federal Hazardous Substances Act), and MDA 
(Medical Devices Act).  With the exception of the FDCA variable, the variables for each 
of these statutes entered with a positive coefficient, implying that they increase the 
likelihood of preemption (relative to FIFRA) after controlling for claim type and 
characteristics. 
 
The positive FCLAA coefficient suggests that the significant “Congress” effect 
from the previous regression probably reflects the impact of the FCLAA.  This follows 
from the fact that the other set of claims involving a regulatory standard set out in a 
federal statute, Section 211 of the Clean Air Act, were held not to preempt state law tort 
claims.  The FCLAA is a special case of a specific product warning adopted by Congress.  
Courts have routinely held that the warning adopted by Congress preempts failure to 
warn claims against cigarette manufacturers after 1969.66  However, courts have also held 
that the FCLAA does not preempt design defect claims against cigarette manufacturers. 
                                                 
64 The sample did not contain enough variation to control for both statute and agency effects.  Regressions 
that attempted to control for both came out poorly because of collinearity. 
65 The estimate for congruence level 3 is smaller than in Table 4, but this is probably due to the presence of 
the NTMVSA dummy.  The NTMVSA dummy codes for cases that are largely congruence level 3 cases.  
An upper bound on the congruence level 3 effect can be estimated by taking the sum of the CONLEV3 and 
NTMVSA effects, which is .668. 
66 Cipollone, 505 U.S., at 530-31.  The Cipollone Court also held that the 1965 FCLAA did not preempt 
state law failure to warn claims.  Id. at 519-20. 
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The positive MDA (medical devices statute) coefficient suggests that even after 
controlling for claim type and characteristics, the medical devices statute has a relatively 
high rate of preemption.  This is due in part to the presence in the sample of cases 
involving the Investigational Devices Exception to the MDA.  Under this exception, 
which governs experimental devices such as new pacemaker designs, courts have held 
claims preempted even though the FDA’s review process falls short of the type of 
examination that would be carried out under a careful balancing of risk and utility.  In 
particular, the investigation devices exemption applies to product designs that have not 
been put into practice. 
 
More importantly, the negative and statistically significant FDCA coefficient 
shows that the federal courts have been unusually reluctant to defer to the FDA’s process 
under the FDCA.  The FDCA coefficient implies that relative to FIFRA, claims under the 
FDCA are less likely to be preempted by a probability differential of .42.  This supports 
the charge in Viscusi et al (1994) that courts have adopted an unjustifiably low 
preemption rate with respect to drugs regulated under the FDCA.  However, this problem 
appears to be limited to the FDA’s process under the FDCA.  No other statute effect in 
Table 5 has a negative and significant coefficient.  Moreover, the FDA’s process under 
the MDA appears to be treated with a great deal more respect by federal courts than its 
process under the FDCA. 
 
The weak positive coefficient for FDA in Table 4 shows that FDA regulation by 
itself has no significant effect, either in increasing or lowering, the likelihood of 
preemption.  The coefficient estimates in Table 5 for MDA and FDCA, however, show 
that the agency’s process under these statutes does have a significant impact on the 
likelihood of preemption.  Claims involving the FDCA are substantially less likely to be 
preempted than is the norm, while claims involving the MDA are slightly more likely to 
be preempted.  This undercuts the claim by Viscusi et al (1994) that it would be socially 
desirable to have a general regulatory compliance defense for products approved by the 
FDA and agencies with similarly rigorous approval processes. 
 
The FHSA (hazardous substances statute) effect is positive and significant.  This 
statute is administered by the Consumer Product Safety Commission, which also 
administers the CPSA (product safety statute).  Again, the result shows that the agency’s 
process rather than the agency itself has the most important effect on preemption.  The 
FHSA is unique in its degree of specificity.  The statute governs warnings on hazardous 
substances.  It does not regulate product design.  Courts have generally held that it 
preempts failure to warn claims and does not preempt design claims.  Faced with such 
specific regulations governing warnings, courts have found it easy to preempt failure-to-
warn lawsuits. 
 
Table 5A presents predicted preemption probabilities based on the regression 
model used for Table 5.  As expected, preemption probabilities increase with the 
congruence level, though there are exceptions.  The high predicted preemption rates in 
the case of CONLEV3 reflect sample constraints: the CONLEV3 category of regulation 
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is observed only in the NTMVSA cases, which have very high preemption rates.  In other 
words, the CONLEV3 and NTMVSA observations are virtually the same.  However, if 
in light of this one focuses on the first, second, and fourth rows of Table 5A, the results 
show predicted preemption rates increasing substantially with each move upward in the 
congruence level variable. 
 
The results in Table 5A address the calls for expansive regulatory compliance 
defenses in Schwartz (2000) and Viscusi et al. (1994).  The high predicted preemption 
rates, some greater than 90 percent, beginning at CONLEV2 and continuing to 
CONLEV4, undermine the argument for a general regulatory compliance defense.  The 
one special case that supports Viscusi is the column of predicted preemption rates under 
the FDCA, which appear to be too low.  Outside of this special case, predicted 
preemption rates vary by case type in a manner consistent with an effort on the part of 
courts to minimize the expected costs of erroneous decisions.   
 
D. State  Court Sample 
 
Because the pool of preemption disputes in state courts is smaller than that in 
federal courts, the sample of cases from state courts is smaller than that from federal 
courts.  This made it difficult to control for agency and statute effects and at the same 
time avoid collinearity.  For this reason I dropped the dummy variables controlling for 
agencies and statutes in the state sample regressions.  For the same reason, I was forced 
to exclude the MANDEF variable and its observations from the regressions. 
 
The results of the simplest regression model for the state observations appear in 
Table 6.  This regression makes no attempt to control for agency and statute effects.  
Because of this, and because of the smaller sample, the R-squared statistic, at 18 percent, 
is considerably lower than those reported from the federal sample.  In addition to the 
sample differences, the lower R-squared may reflect a greater level of inherent 
unpredictability in the state cases. 
 
The most glaring results in Table 6 are the positive and highly significant period 
variables (PERIOD2 and PERIOD3).  They show that the effect of Cippolone in the 
state courts was much more dramatic than in the federal courts.  While Cippolone 
increased the probability of preemption by roughly .20 in the federal courts (see Table 5), 
it raised the probability of preemption by roughly .5 in the state courts. 
 
The second noticeable difference between the state and federal court results is that 
the variable COMPLIED, which indicates that the plaintiff made no allegation of non-
compliance by the defendant with the agency’s regulations, enters with a positive and 
marginally significant coefficient.  In other words, state courts are less likely to preempt 
when the plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to comply with the federal regulatory 
standard.  This suggests that the state courts are less deferential toward agency review 
processes than are the federal courts. 
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Although the state courts are less deferential toward agency review processes, 
they still behave in a manner consistent with this paper’s error-cost framework.  One 
implication of the model is that the effect of compliance on the probability of preemption 
should be greater in the case of failure to warn claims than among other types of claim.  
The reason is that it is easier to accurately assess compliance in the typical failure to warn 
claim than in the typical design defect claim.  The model’s prediction was confirmed in a 
later regression, not reported in the table.67 
 
The third and most important difference between the state and federal sample is 
the weak result for congruence level four (CONLEV4).  State courts appear to be no 
more likely to find such claims preempted than they are for claims with the lowest 
congruence level, which is a disturbing result if valid.   
 
In order to examine more closely how the state courts have treated cases of the 
highest congruence level, I ran a second regression including interaction terms for 
CONLEV4 and the period variables.  The results are reported in Table 7.  They reveal 
that the CONLEV4 effect has declined over the three periods within the state sample.  
CONLEV4 has a greater positive impact on the likelihood of preemption than 
CONLEV2 in the first period (pre-Cippolone).  The two effects are roughly the same in 
the second period (after Cippolone and before Lohr), and the CONLEV4 effect 
diminishes in the third period (post-Lohr). 
 
The declining effect of the highest congruence level is the result of two 
evolutionary processes in the state courts.  One, already discussed, is the effect of 
Cippolone, which made state courts more likely to preempt cases of the second and third 
congruence levels.  This process probably explains the rough equality between the effects 
of congruence level two and congruence level four in the second period.  The second 
evolutionary process is the result of Lohr.  The weak estimated effect, in the post-Lohr 
period, of the highest congruence level variable shows how state courts have responded 
to Lohr.  A substantial percentage of the state courts in this sample, unlike the federal 
courts, read Lohr as imposing an exceptionally high burden on defendants who claim that 
federal regulation should have a preemptive effect.68 
                                                 
67 In a separate regression I included interaction terms for COMPLIED, FAILWARN, and DESDEF.  
They provided weak support for the model’s implication that the effect of compliance on the probability of 
preemption should be stronger in the case of failure to warn claims.  (The reason is that since the risk of 
error should be lower in failure to warn cases, courts should be less concerned about the potential costs of 
denying the preemption defense.)  The coefficient for the interaction of COMPLIED and FAILWARN 
was 2.99 (t-statistic 1.35).  The coefficient for the interaction of COMPLIED and DESDEF was .152 (t-
statistic .58).  A similar pattern was observed in the federal sample.  In a regression similar to that in Table 
5, but including interaction terms, the coefficient for the interaction of COMPLIED and FAILWARN was 
-.158 (t-statistic -.94) and that for COMPLIED and DESDEF was -.346 (t-statistic -1.47).  Of course, one 
reason why these results are so weak is that the plaintiffs’ assertions of noncompliance may be unsupported 
by any evidence in most cases.  As I noted earlier, any clear case of noncompliance would have settled out 
of court, so all of the cases in which COMPLIED = 0 involve contested assertions of noncompliance. 
68 Many state courts in the sample appear to have adopted the approach of the Eleventh Circuit in Goodlin 
v. Medtronic, Inc., 167 F.3d 1367 (11th Cir. 1999).  In particular, the following twelve states in the state 
court sample have at least one post-Lohr decision rejecting preemption in a case involving the highest 
congruence level (CONLEV4): Michigan (state appeals court), Missouri (Supreme Court), Illinois 
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The results of the empirical analysis of the state cases must be interpreted with 
care, given the relatively small sample, and the consequent failure to control for agency 
and statute effects.  Because of these weaknesses, the state sample results do not shed 
light on the importance of the perception of agency independence, or of respect for the 
rigor of the review process required by the regulatory statute. 
 
With these shortfalls in mind, one lesson suggested by the sample of state cases is 
that state courts do not seem to be as sensitive to error cost concerns as the federal courts.  
They are quicker to second-guess the agency’s process by refusing to preempt claims 
even when the agency has adopted a rigorous process, and when the plaintiff alleges that 
the defendant failed to comply with the agency’s regulations.  These findings should not 
be taken as a rejection of the error cost model, which is largely confirmed by the federal 
court sample.  However, they do show that the model simply does not fit as well to the 
sample of state court decisions. 
 
The state sample results may reflect the redistributional bias found in Tabarrok 
and Helland (1999).69  Tabarrok and Helland found that state courts give higher awards 
when the defendant is an out-of-state corporation, and that this redistributional tendency 
is enhanced in states with elected judiciaries.  Most of the products liability cases in the 
state sample probably involve out-of-state corporate defendants.  The greater reluctance 
in the states to preempt claims that have undergone the most rigorous agency review 
processes, as well as those in which the plaintiff alleges noncompliance with agency 
standards, may reflect redistributional incentives. 
  
  
V. Conclusion 
 
The literature and much of the case law on preemption continue to focus on 
legislative intent as the primary theory of the preemption decisions.  Intent, as a theory, is 
proposed sometimes in the positive sense, as a theory that explains the actual case 
outcomes, and sometimes in the normative sense, in the belief that a requirement of clear 
legislative intent as a necessary condition for preemption would force Congress to state 
its own preferences clearly.  This paper has rejected the intent-based approach, as both 
futile and unnecessary.  The preemption case law can be explained by objective factors. 
 
Admittedly, legislative intent must play some role in preemption analysis.  If 
Congress preempted state tort lawsuits in absolutely unambiguous language, that would 
presumably settle the matter.  However, the preemption provisions in federal statutes are 
almost never stated in unambiguous language.  The statutory language almost always 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Supreme Court), California (appeals court), New York (appeals court), Oregon (appeals court), Kentucky 
(Supreme Court), Washington (appeals court), Texas (appeals court), Montana (Supreme Court), Indiana 
(Supreme Court), Wisonsin (appeals court).  Although not reported in the regression tables, I also ran a 
regression similar to that in Table 7 on the federal sample.  Unlike the results for the state sample, the effect 
of CONLEV4 does not decline over time in the federal sample. 
69 Alexander Tabarrok and Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J. Law 
& Econ. 157 (April 1999). 
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leaves courts with several degrees of freedom on the preemption question.  In view of 
this, some theory other than legislative intent is necessary to explain the actual case 
outcomes – or to provide a normative theory of preemption. 
 
This paper has offered an alternative to the intent-based theory of preemption.  
The theory offered here envisions the preemption question as if it were a choice between 
two decision processes, federal agencies and trial courts, both subject to error.  The 
optimal preemption rule minimizes the costs of erroneous decisions to commit to the 
agency process.  I have argued that this approach favors preemption when there is a high 
degree of congruence between the regulatory and common law standards.  The case law 
appears to be consistent with this theory. 
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TABLE 3 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
 
Variables 
 
 Definition 
 
Dependent Variable: 
PREEMPT 
 
 
Dummy variable equaling one if claim is preempted, zero 
otherwise 
 
Independent Variables: 
CONLEV1 
 
 
Dummy variable equaling one if claim is of congruence 
level one (no specific requirement) 
 
CONLEV2 
 
Dummy variable equaling one if claim is of congruence 
level two (generic minimum standard) 
 
CONLEV3 
 
Dummy variable equaling one if claim is of congruence 
level three (menu of options standard) 
 
CONLEV4 
 
Dummy variable equaling one if claim is of congruence 
level four (highly specific regulations) 
 
DESDEF 
 
Dummy variable equaling one if claim asserts defective 
design theory  
 
FAILWARN 
 
Dummy variable equaling one if claim asserts failure to 
warn theory 
 
MANDEF 
 
Dummy variable equaling one if claim asserts 
manufacturing defect theory 
 
COURTLEV Dummy variable equaling one if deciding court is an appellate court, zero if trial court 
 
COMPLIED 
 
Dummy variable equaling one if defendant complied 
with regulation, zero if allegation of noncompliance 
 
FRAUD 
 
Dummy variable equaling one if plaintiff asserts fraud on 
agency theory 
 
PERIOD1 (PERIOD2, PERIOD3) 
 
Dummy variables coding for period of claim (pre-
Cipollone = period 1, post-Cipollone to Lohr = period 2, 
post-Lohr = period 3) 
 
 38
TABLE 4 
Federal Court Sample Regression Results with Agency Effects 
 
Variable Marginal 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
T Stat Significance 
level 
COURTLEV* .143 .082 1.74 .083 
DESDEF** -.268 .108 -2.48 .013 
MANDEF** .285 .123 2.31 .021 
CONLEV2** .552 .099 5.58 .000 
CONLEV3** .559 .062 9.06 .000 
CONLEV4** .754 .094 8.01 .000 
PERIOD1** -.396 .113 -3.48 .000 
PERIOD3* -.237 .121 -1.96 .050 
COMPLIED -.118 .105 -1.12 .263 
FRAUD .132 .199 .66 .508 
FDA .045 .108 .42 .673 
CPSC .033 .198 .17 .867 
DOT .148 .169 .87 .382 
CONGRESS** .352 .077 4.60 .000 
COAST-
GUARD** 
.347 .060 5.80 .000 
 
Probit using PREEMPT (claim preempted =1, not preempted = 0) as dependent variable, 
on federal sample and controlling for agency effects. 
 
Number of observations = 243 
Pseudo R2 = 0.43 
Log Likelihood =  -89.48 
** statistically significant at the five percent level  
* statistically significant at the ten percent level 
Note: Observations associated with dummies for FAA and HUD agencies were dropped 
because of missing observations or lack variation in the sample. 
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TABLE 5 
Federal Court Sample Regression Results with Statute Effects 
 
Variable Marginal 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
T Stat Significance 
level 
COURTLEV .102 .089 1.14 .254 
DESDEF** -.271 .124 -2.19 .029 
MANDEF .265 .118 2.25 .025 
CONLEV2** .553 .092 6.00 .000 
CONLEV3** .549 .064 8.50 .000 
CONLEV4** .760 .096 7.90 .000 
PERIOD2** .282 .087 3.26 .001 
PERIOD3* .141 .095 1.49 .137 
COMPLIED -.156 .107 -1.45 .148 
FRAUD .119 .206 .57 .566 
MDA .181 .102 1.78 .075 
FHSA** .309 .070 4.45 .000 
NTMVSA .119 .198 .60 .549 
FBSA** .332 .058 5.67 .000 
CPSA -.106 .290 -.37 .714 
FDCA** -.419 .188 -2.22 .026 
FCLAA** .379 .062 6.08 .000 
 
Probit using PREEMPT (claim preempted =1, not preempted = 0) as dependent variable, 
on federal sample and controlling for statute effects. 
 
Number of observations = 237 
Pseudo R2 = 0.52 
Log Likelihood = -73.39 
** statistically significant at the five percent level  
* statistically significant at the ten percent level 
Note: Observations associated with dummies for FAA, LIA, NMHCSSA, HMTA, and 
CAA statutes were dropped because of missing observations or lack of variation in the 
sample. 
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TABLE 5A 
Predicted Preemption Rates by Congruence Level and Agency 
   MDA  FHSA NTMVSA  FBSA  CPSA FDCA FIFRA FCLAA 
CONLEV1  .010   .142    .006*  .151  .001 .000 .002* .200* 
CONLEV2  .532*   .909    .451*  .915*  .221 .056 .315 .941 
CONLEV3  .985   .999    .975*  .999  .907 .694 .946 .999 
CONLEV4  .749*   .973    .680  .975  .430 .160 .544 .984 
Notes: “*” denotes the “in sample” predicted values.  The predicted values assume 
DESDEF=1, MANDEF=0, COMPLIED=1, COURTLEV=1, PERIOD3=1, PERIOD2=0, 
FRAUD=0. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
State Court Sample Regression Results 
 
Variable Marginal 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
T Stat Significance 
level 
COURTLEV -.124 .203 -.61 .541 
DESDEF** -.403 .123 -3.28 .001 
CONLEV2* .408 .224 1.82 .069 
CONLEV3** .556 .177 3.14 .002 
CONLEV4 .165 .247 .67 .503 
PERIOD2** .545 .154 3.53 .000 
PERIOD3** .501 .139 3.61 .000 
COMPLIED* .216 .131 1.64 .100 
FRAUD .020 .412 .05 .960 
 
Probit using PREEMPT (claim preempted =1, not preempted = 0) as dependent variable, 
on state sample. 
 
Number of observations = 118 
Pseudo R2 = 0.18 
Log Likelihood =  -66.37 
**  statistically significant at the five percent level  
* statistically significant at the ten percent level 
 
 
 41
TABLE 7 
State Court Sample Regression Results with Period Interactions 
 
Variable Marginal 
Effect 
Standard 
Error 
T Stat Significance 
level 
COURTLEV -.075 .201 -.37 .708 
DESDEF** -.410 .126 -3.25 .001 
CONLEV2* .454 .221 2.05 .040 
CONLEV3** .630 .156 4.03 .000 
(CONLEV4) x 
(PERIOD1) ** 
.554 .196 2.82 .005 
(CONLEV4) x 
(PERIOD2) * 
.445 .263 1.69 .091 
(CONLEV4) x 
(PERIOD3)  
.050 .265 .19 .851 
PERIOD2** .570 .195 2.93 .003 
PERIOD3** .658 .137 4.80 .000 
COMPLIED* .222 .131 1.71 .088 
FRAUD .014 .429 .03 .973 
 
Probit using PREEMPT (claim preempted =1, not preempted = 0) as dependent variable, 
on state sample, and interacting congruence level four with period variables. 
 
Number of observations = 118 
Pseudo R2 = 0.20 
Log Likelihood =  -64.04 
**  statistically significant at the five percent level  
* statistically significant at the ten percent level 
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Appendix 
TABLE A1 
Federal Agencies and Statutes 
 
 
 
 
 MDA (Medical Devices Amendment) 
       FDA 
Food and Drug 
Administration FDCA (Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act) 
 
 
 
 FCLAA (Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act) 
     Congress 
 CAA, §211 (Clean Air Act) 
 
 
  
         HUD NMHCSSA (National Manufactured Home Construction 
(Housing and Urban   and Safety Standards Act) 
Development) 
     
 
 
 HMTA (Hazardous Materials Transportation Act) 
         DOT LIA (Locomotive Inspection Act) (Fed. Railroad Admin.) 
(Department of FBSA (Federal Boat Safety Act) (Coast Guard) 
 Transportation) NTMVSA (National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act) 
 FAA (Federal Aviation Act) (Fed. Aviation Admin.) 
 
 
 
       CPSC CPSA (Consumer Product Safety Act) 
(Consumer Product 
 Safety Commission) FHSA (Federal Hazardous Substances Act) 
 
 
 
       EPA FIFRA (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act) 
(Environmental  
 Protection Act) CAA  
 
 43
 
TABLE A2 
 
Preemption Rates by Agency and by Statute (federal sample) 
 
  Agency Design Defect Claims Failure to Warn Claims 
  FDA 39% 64% 
  EPA 0 78 
  CPSC 20 71 
  FAA 0 0* 
   
  Statute   
  MDA 46 80 
  FCLAA 0* 100 
  FDCA 20 11 
  FBSA 91 100 
  NTMVSA 67 83 
  FHSA 0* 100* 
  FIFRA 0 77 
 
* based on 4 or fewer cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
